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STUDENT NOTES
A recent case held that a demonstration by a physician that
he could drink the same amount and same kind of ground glass
that the plaintiff allegedly drank was not proper, because the
mental reactions of the plaintiff and the physician would not be
the same after drinking the glass. This decision seems in accord
with the limitation, since the conditions under which the plaintiff
swallowed the glass and the conditions under which the physician
swallowed the glass would not be the same.11
Evidence by way of demonstrations should be received with
caution, and be admitted only when it is obvious to the court, from
the nature of the offer, that the jury will be enlightened rather
than confused.' In many instances a slight change in the condi-
tions under which the experiment is made will so distort the
result as wholly to destroy its value as evidence and make it harm-
ful rather than helpful. The value and weight of demonstrations
as evidence should always be left for the jury's consideration and
determination.'
In conclusion, demonstrations of both types, personal and
mechanical, should be allowed to determine a disputed fact and
to enlighten and clarify issues for the jury, (1) when it can be
done safely without danger to anyone, (2) where there is no
opportunity to perpetrate a fraud on the court and (3) when it
will not be prejudicial.
VILEY 0. BLACKBURN
PARTNERSHIPS-TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
For many purposes, in the absence of statutes, a partnership
is not looked upon as a legal entity. It cannot sue or be sued in
its own capacity. All suits involving the partnership must be
brought by or against the individuals occupying the relation of
partners.1 On the other hand, a partnership at common law was
deemed to have some existence in itself which allowed it, as an
entity, certain rights and imposed upon it certain obligations
distinct from the rights and obligations of the individual partners.
Contracts could, for example, be made or taken in the firm name.2
This dual concept is well illustrated by the different situations
that arise in regard to the property rights of a partnership. It
is generally held that a partnership may not take, hold or convey
legal title to real property,' but a partnership may own personal
" Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ark. v. Lanston, 198 Ark. 59, 127
S. W. 2d 263 (1939).
" Landro v. Great Northern R. Co., 117 Minn. 306, 135 N. W.
991 (1912); Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 55
N. D. 353, 213 N. W. 841 (1927).
"Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 42 P. 2d 685 (1935).
'MEcHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 6.
s Ibid. at sec. 123.
'Adams v. Church, 42 Ore. 270, 70 Pac. 1037 (1902); MECHEM,
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) sec. 153.
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property4 and the rights of the partnership and of its creditors to
such property are distinct from the rights of the partners as in-
dividuals and their creditors.'
These conflicting conceptions are even extended so as to affect
the rights in real property itself. As has been said, a partnership
cannot take, hold or convey legal title to real estate. The reason
generally assigned is that since the partnership has no legal exist-
ence, in itself, a deed to the partnership is void for the lack of a
grantee.' In most of the jurisdictions following this view, how-
ever, it is clear that the deed is not a nullity. It is true that legal
title is not thereby conveyed, but it is held that the legal title is
retained by the grantor in trust for the partnership. Thus the
firm as an entity takes and holds an equitable right in the real
property. This equitable interest is treated, not as property of
the partners as individuals, but as property of the partnership.8
As such it is subject to the debts of the firm, under certain cir-
cumstances, in preference to the claims of individual creditors
of the partners. The widow of a partner has no dower interest
in such property except as to that remaining after the debts and
equities of the partnership are adjusted.' While the courts speak
of the equitable interest in real property, which is held by a
partnership, as personal property" and treat it as such for partner-
ship purposes it has been held that after the termination of the
partnership any real property not disposed of in adjusting the
equities of the partners and payment of debts of the partnership
is returned to the individual partners as land." It is the deceased
partner's interest in this remaining land which may be subject
to the dower interest of his widow."
The view that a conveyance to a partnership is void or that
it merely conveys an equitable interest to the partnership has not
been acceptable to many courts, and there has been a tendency
among them to give effect to such a conveyance, as far as possible,
under one guise or another.
Where the name of the firm consists entirely of the names of
living partners, such as "Smith & Smith", the named persons take
legal title to the property which they hold in trust for the
'MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 150.
Ibid. at sec. 152.
'Adams v. Church, 42 Ore. 270, 70 Pac. 1037 (1902).
'Fred Gordon & Son v. Panhokin, 83 Neb. 204, 119 N. W. 449
(1909); Frost v. Wolf, 77 Tex. 455, 14 S. W. 440 (1890).
'MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 154.
'Ibid. at sec. 165.
"'Ibid. at sec. 163.
"Ibid. at sec. 166.
" Ibid.
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partnership.' The imperfect identification of the grantees is
treated as a latent ambiguity which may be explained by parol
evidence." Where the firm name appearing as grantee in the deed
consists of one or more living partners coupled with words indicat-
ing additional associates, such as "Smith & Bros." or "J. W. Smith
& Co.," there is a diversity of opinion as to whether the named
partner takes the whole legal title to be held in trust for the
partnership or whether the designation of the associates is suffi-
cient to permit their indentification by parol evidence. In some
jurisdictions the named partner is treated as the grantee of the
legal title" in trust for the partnership. In other jurisdictions all
partners who were members of the firm at the time of the con-
veyance are deemed, when identified, to hold legal title, although
the deed does not purport to name them as individuals'
Where the name of the partnership is entirely non-personal,
such as "The Enterprise Manufacturing Company," it is generally
held that the conveyance is void as far as a transfer of the legal
title is concerned, but that the partnership so named as grantee
takes an equitable interest." There are some jurisdictions which
make no distinction in the different types of partnership names
but in each of the three situations discussed above hold that title
vests in the several partners jointly as trustees for the partner-
ship."
As a result of statutes in some jurisdictions, a deed naming
a partnership as grantee is valid and effective as a conveyance
of both legal and equitable title to the partnership as such.'
" Cole v. Mettee, 65 Ark. 503, 47 S. W. 407 (1898); Taylor v.
Danley, 83 Kan. 646, 112 Pac. 595 (1911). Cf. Walker v. Miller, 139
N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125 (1905). Conveyance named as grantee a
firm, all partners of which were dead. The business was being
operated under the firm name by personal representatives of the
deceased partners. Held that both legal and equitable titles were
conveyed to heirs of the deceased partners. But see Frost v. Wolf,
77 Texas 455, 14 S. W. 440 (1890) where it is said that a conveyance
to a firm, the name consisting of surnames of all partners, conveys
only equitable title because the full name of none of the partners
is given.
" Cole v. Mettee, 65 Ark. 503, 47 S. W. 407 (1898); Taylor v.
Danley, 83 Kan. 646, 112 Pac. 595 (1911); Walker v. Miller, 139
N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125 (1905).
'Berg v. Johnson, 139 Ark. 243, 213 S. W. 393 (1919); Winter
v. Stock, 29 Cal. 407 (1866); Moreau v. Saffarans & Co., 35 Tenn.
(3 Sneed) 595 (1856); see Fred Gordon & Son v. Panhokin, 83 Neb.
204, 119 N. W. 449 (1909).
'Ky. Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 Fed. 840 (C. C. A.
6th 1918); Robinson v. Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252 (1916).
"1Spaulding Mfg. Co. v. Godbold, 92 Ark. 63, 121 S. W. 1063
(1909).
' Ky. Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 6th
1918); Carter v. Flexnor, 92 Ky. 400, 17 S. W. 851 (1891); Wilhite's
Adm'r v. Boulware, 88 Ky. 169, 10 S. W. 629 (1889).
"' UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, sec. 8 (3).
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The Uniform Partnership Act, which has been adopted in about
half of the states,' provides that "any estate in real property may
be acquired in the partnership name.' 'M This view overrules our
historical concept of the legal incapacity of a partnership and it
probably could not logically be arrived at by the courts without
the aid of a statute. It gives a partnership certain attributes of
a corporation. Yet is that objectionable? Today a partnership
does business in the same way as a corporation and most people
do business with it as such. By enabling a partnership to take,
hold or convey real property the many conflicting rules, fine dis-
tinctions and questionable fictions which have complicated the
problem under the common law may be dispensed with. Certainly
the advantages of such a result seem to counterbalance any un-
desirable features which might grow out of a lessening of the
distinction between a corporate and an unincorporated business.
Reconveyance of property by a partnership has also created
certain problems at common law. A conveyance by the person or
persons holding legal title in trust for the partnership, in breach
of trust, will, under the law of trusts, defeat the equitable interest
of the partnership when made to a bona fide purchaser." That,
however, is not a conveyance by the partnership but by the
trustee as an individual and does not directly concern the present
problem.
Under the usual rules of partnership law, each partner is an
agent of the firm with power to bind the partnership within the
scope of the partnership business.' This rule has never been
followed, however, to the extent of permitting a partner, in the
absence of further authority, to sell the business of the partner-
ship 4 or deprive it of its interest in real property.' A conveyance
by such an unauthorized partner, in the name of the partnership
as grantor, conveys only such interest as he as a partner held in
'UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED (1922), vol. 7, 1944 Supp. p. 6.
States in which the uniform act has been adopted and the dates of
adoption: Alaska (1917), Arkansas (1941), California (1929), Colo-
rado (1931), Idaho (1920), Illinois (1917), Maryland (1916),
Massachusetts (1923), Michigan (1917), Minnesota (1921), Nebraska
(1943), Nevada (1931), New Jersey (1919), New York (1919),
North Carolina (1941), Oregon (1939), Pennsylvania (1915), South
Dakota (1923), Tennessee (1917), Utah (1921), Vermont (1941),
Virginia (1918), Wisconsin (1915), Wyoming (1917).
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, sec. 8 (3).
"Winter v. Stock, 29 Cal. 407 (1866); Robinson Bank v. Miller,
153 Ill. 244, 38 N. E. 1078 (1894); MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) sec. 167; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
sec. 296.
" MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 244.
24 Ibid. at sec. 274.
Ruffner v. McConnel, 17 Ill. 212 (1855).
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the property, that is, the grantee becomes entitled to share, as a
tenant in common, in any excess in the property purported to be
conveyed after the partnership purposes are completed.'
When a properly authorized partner, however, executes a con-
veyance in the name of the partnership, the partnership and the
co-partners as individuals are bound by the conveyance.' If those
holding legal title refuse to join in the deed as grantors, the
conveyance operates as a contract to convey" and will be enforced
against the recalcitrant partners by a decree for specific perform-
ance by a court of equity.'
In some jurisdictions it is not necessary that the partner act-
ing on behalf of the partnership be expressly authorized to convey
realty. It is sufficient if the authority may be implied from the
acts of the other partners' or from the nature of the partnership 1
as where the dealing in land is a usual practice of the partnership.
The Statute of Frauds, as adopted in many states, requires that
the authority of an agent to convey, or to contract to convey real
property be in writing.' In these states express written authority
should be required and in its absence the contract or conveyance
by one partner should not affect the interest of the firm or the
other partners.'
Here again, there is no apparent reason why a partnership
named as grantee in a deed should not reconvey the property in
the same name. If this right were recognized it would do much to
clear the records of technical defects and obviate the necessity
of searching for facts and obtaining affidavits as to matters out-
side the records. The Uniform Partnership Act also follows this
view by providing that where legal title has been conveyed to a
partnership it "may be conveyed only in the name of the partner-
ship." States having adopted the uniform act have a convenience
in conveying partnership property and a certainty of titles not
found in the common law states.
FRED B. REDWINE
' Dillon v. Brown, 11 Gray 179 (Mass. 1858); Chester v. Dick-
erson, 54 N. Y. 1 (1873).
'Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780 (1910); Sullivan v.
Smith, 15 Neb. 476, 19 N. W. 620 (1884); Robinson v. Daughtry, 171
N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252 (1916).
'Robinson v. Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252 (1916).
'Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780 (1910).
Merchants and Farmers Bank v. Johnston, 130 Ga. 661, 61 S. E.
543 (1908).
'Rovelsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 9 So. 182 (1891); Robinson v.
Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252 (1916).
' MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (3d ed. 1923)
sec. 96.
' Hart v. Withers, 1 Penr. & W. 285 (Pa. 1830) requires that the
authority be in writing. But see McGahan v. Bank of Rondout, 156
U. S. 218 (1895) where it is held that the authority need not be in
writing.
"UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, sec. 8(3).
